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Abstract
We investigate the conditions under which R&D investment by rival firms may
be negatively or positively correlated. Using a two-stage game the influence
of spillovers and product substitution is investigated. It is shown that un-
der Cournot competition, the sign of the R&D reaction function depends on
four types of environments in terms of the level of product substitution and of
spillovers. We then test the prediction of the model on the world’s largest manu-
facturing corporations. We assume that firms make oblivious R&D investments
based on the R&D decision of the average rival company. We then develop a
dynamic panel data model that accounts for the endogeneity of the decision of
the mean rival firms. Results corroborate the validity of the theoretical model.
Keywords: Process R&D, Spillovers, Product substitution, Reaction function,
GMM
JEL: D43, L13, 031
1. Introduction
Economists have long argued that research spillovers diminish the firm’s
incentives to undertake research activities (Nelson, 1959). By benefiting from
research output of their competing counterparts, firms may prefer to free-ride
on their rival’s investments in research and decide to reduce their own research
efforts, what we call the Nelson and Arrow disincentive to perform R&D. The
seminal models of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) on cooperation in R&D
and of Levin and Reiss (1988) on cost-reducing and demand-enhancing R&D
have given rise to a stream of research showing that in fact, spillovers may either
impede or conversely boost firm R&D investment. In Bondt and Veugelers
(1991), imperfect product substitution moderates the disincentive to invest in
R&D, so that the benefits stemming from the rival firm’s research outweigh the
loss in profits due to the reduction in demand. It has since been shown that
these results depends also on the number of rivals in the market (Bondt et al.,
1992) and on the uncertainty of innovation (Goel, 1995).
This paper develops a two-stage Cournot model reconciling the views that
spillovers may either impede or conversely boost firm R&D investments. Key
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to the model is the assumption that the two products are imperfect substitutes.
The rationale is straightforward. If firms do business in disjunct markets, they
do not compete in output. Technological spillovers are then harmless, as they
do not reduce firm market size. Conversely, if products are close substitutes,
technological spillovers may enter into the production function of the rival com-
pany. Whether firms may reap profits from their research efforts depends on
the degree of knowledge spillovers and of product substitution. It is this mix
between technological spillovers on the one hand and product market compe-
tition on the other hand which will determine whether R&D investments are
complements or substitutes.
The paper develops an empirical model of the R&D reaction functions of the
world’s largest companies. The combination of patent data from the USPTO
and financial information from Compustat of 315 companies allows us to deter-
mine the degree of knowledge spillovers and product substitution for any dyad
of firms. Because companies cope with an array of competitors, we assume that
firms make oblivious R&D investments based on the R&D decision of the aver-
age rival company. This assumption allows to determine empirically the sign of
the R&D reaction function. Dynamic Panel Data models account for the endo-
geneity of the R&D decision by the mean rival company. Results corroborate
the theoretical predictions.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 investigates the conditions de-
termining the positive, resp. negative, correlations between the firms’ process
R&D. Sections 4 and 5 presents the empirical protocol and discuss the results.
Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider two firms (i = 1, 2) that produce differentiated goods in quantity
q1 and q2, respectively, with the numeraire goodm. As in Lin and Saggi (2002)1,
the representative consumer’s utility function associated with the consumption
of both differentiated goods is quadratic and given by
u(qi, qj ,m) = a(qi + qj)− b
2
(q2i + q
2
j )− σbqiqj +m, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (1)
Parameter σ represents the degree of substitution between the two products.
Unlike Lin and Saggi (2002), and identical to Bondt and Veugelers (1991), we
allow σ to be either negative or positive: −1 ≤ σ ≤ 1. A positive value for σ
implies that products are substitutive (i.e. low product differentiation), whereas
a negative value entails complementarity between goods i and j2. The utility
maximization programme leads to the following demand system:
pi = a− b(qi + σqj) and pj = a− b(σqi + qj), (2)
1Lin and Saggi (2002) draw on previous work such as by Dixit (1979) and Vives (1990)
who develop a duopoly model substantiating entry barriers and discuss the role of information
and competitive advantages, respectively.
2Note that this utility function suggests both a preference for variety - because of its
quadratic terms - together with a taste for product differentiation - because of the negative
effect of σ on consumer utility.
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with qi+σqj = Q < a/b. Note that if σ > 0 (resp. σ = 1), the two products are
(resp. perfect) substitutes, implying that the two firms compete in a duopoly
market. If instead σ < 0, the two products are complementary, and an increase
in the demand for one product increases the demand for the complementary
product, leading to an increase in its price. If σ = 0, the two products are
entirely unrelated, and the two firms operate as monopolists in two different
markets. Hence, an increase in the degree of product differentiation (i.e. a
decrease in σ), denotes an outward shift of the demand curve for both firms.
Next, firms i and j face constant marginal cost A, which can be reduced
by means of process R&D xi and xj , respectively. As in d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988), firms face externalities in process R&D and parameter β
indicates the share of firm j’s process R&D that spills over to the cost function
of firm i. The total cost of production computes as
Ci(qi, xi, xj , di) = [A− xi − βxj ]qi + γx2i /2 (3)
where 0 < A < a and xi + βxj < A. As in Bondt and Veugelers (1991), we
assume −1 < β < 1. Positive spillovers (β > 0) imply positive R&D external-
ities due to a lack of appropriability. The case for negative spillovers (β < 0)
is admittedly more peculiar, but such negative externalities may stem from
factor market imperfections and externalities in technology diffusion (Arthur,
1989). We assume convex costs in process R&D investment, γx2i /2, where the
efficiency parameter γ reflects diminishing returns to process R&D. Using the
inverse demand function in (2) and the cost function from equation in (3), the
profit function reads
pii = (a− b(qi + σqj))qi − (A− xi − βxj)qi − γ x
2
i
2
. (4)
2.1. Output Stage
Let us first consider the output stage. Firms choose the optimal level of qi
and qj as to maximize profit pii and pij respectively, leading to the symmetric
Nash-Cournot equilibrium as in the following
q∗i =
(a−A)(2− σ) + (2− βσ)xi + (2β − σ)xj
b(4− σ2) , (5)
given that qi + σqj ≤ (2−σ)b(4−σ2) [2(a − A) + 2A] ≤ ab . Substituting equilibrium
output q∗i in (4) yields the reduced-form profit function
piq∗i =
((a−A)(2− σ) + (2− βσ)xi + (2β − σ)xj)2
b (4− σ2)2 − γ
x2i
2
. (6)
Observe the ambivalent effect of xj on optimal quantity q∗i and optimal
profit piq∗i . When σ < 2β (resp. σ > 2β), process R&D investment by firm j
increases (resp. decreases) the optimal quantity of firm i, reflecting the trade-off
between knowledge spillovers and product differentiation (the inverse of product
substitution).
Notice that setting σ to unity yields equilibrium output q∗i and profit pi
q∗
i
identical to d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Setting β to zero instead, as
3
in Lin and Saggi (2002), reveals that q∗i and pi
q∗
i are negatively affected by the
degree of substitution σ3.
2.2. Process R&D Stage
From (6), the optimal levels of process R&D can be derived by computing
∂piq∗/∂xi = 0, which provides a symmetric solution4 for x∗i
x∗i =
(a−A)(2− βσ)
b
2γ(2− σ)(2 + σ)2 − (2− βσ)(1 + β)
. (7)
Note that for σ = 1, optimal process R&D investment (x∗i ) corresponds
to the non-cooperative game on both stages in the case of d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988). Substituting (7) for xi into (6), the reduced-form profit
function now reads
pix∗i =
(a−A)2γ
(
−2(−2 + βσ)2 + bγ (−4 + σ2)2)
(4− 2β(−2 + σ)− 2β2σ + bγ(−2 + σ)(2 + σ)2)2 (8)
3. R&D reaction functions in the β − σ space
In what follows, we analyze the reaction functions g(x∗j ) for varying values
ofσ and β. The reduced form of the reaction function in process R&D reads:
x∗i =
−2(2− βσ)(a−A)(2− σ) + (2β − σ)xj/b(−4 + σ2)2
2(2−βσ)2
b(−4+σ2) − γ
(9)
with i, j = 1, 2 and i ≤ j. The numerator of 9 reflects the second-order
condition in the second stage (process R&D) and must be negative. It appears
immediately that the sign of the effect of firm j’s investment in process R&D
on firm’s i’s own investment in process R&D depends on the joint conditions of
product substitution σ and research spillovers β. Computing | ∂xi/∂xj | yields:
−2(2− βσ)(2β − σ)/b (−4 + σ2)2
2(2−βσ)2
b(−4+σ2)2 + γ
(10)
As we are interested in the impact of spillovers, given the degree of product
substitution, we plot a β−σ-diagram that depicts the optimal response in R&D
to changes in spillovers, β, and the degree of substitution, σ. The horizontal
axis depicts spillovers, the vertical the degree of substition. All solid curves
denote equal levels of optimal R&D conditional on β and σ. The two crossing
lines represent the lowest level of R&D expenditure. The shadowed planes
mark instable solutions. Any combination of β and σ that exceeds any linear
combination of vectors {0, 4/5} and {1/2(3−√7), 1} is an unstable solution for
3Take for example optimal quantity q∗i and set β to zero. Optimal output reads q
∗
i =
(a−A)(2−σ)+2xi−σxj
b(4−σ2) . Computing
∂q∗i
∂σ
yields....
4The second order condition requires γ > 2(−2+βσ)
2
b(−4+σ2)2
, which holds for 0 < σ < 1, if γ > 1/b.
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the optimal level in R&D. This instability may lead to corner solutions which
implies specialization in R&D. Moreover, if σ > 2β the R&D levels of xi and
xj are positively related. Then, the solutions are instable, too, so that R&D-
expenditure can diverge.
[Figure 1 about here.]
This model enlightens the rationale underlying process R&D decisions by
firms. Such decision not only reduces the firm’s own marginal costs, thereby
shifting its supply curve to the right. It also affects the rival company’s decisions
by affecting its supply and demand curves, via the strategic parameters β and
σ, respectively. In fact, the values and signs of these strategic parameters are
key to understand the concealed incentives to invest in process R&D.
Theory tells us that the sign of the reaction function ∂xi/∂xj depends on
the location of the dyads in the β−σ space. Our choice is to estimate the sign of
f (xjt) in the four corners of the β − σ space. We name Region 1 the lower-left
part of the space where β ∈ [−1.0;−.6] and σ ∈ [−1.0;−.6]. We name Region
2 the upper-left part of the space where β ∈ [−1.0;−.6] and σ ∈ [+.6;+1.0].
For both Regions 1 and 2, theory predicts substitution between xi and xj , so
that ∂xi/∂xj < 0. Region 3 is the upper-right corner where β ∈ [+.6;+1.0]
and σ ∈ [+.6;+1.0], and Region 4 the lower-right corner where β ∈ [+.6;+1.0]
and σ ∈ [−1.0;−.6]. For both these Regions, theory predicts complementarity
between xi and xj , so that ∂xi/∂xj > 0.
Theory also warns us about the stability of the reaction functions for Regions
2 and 4: with a sufficiently high research costs γ, the reaction functions are well-
behaved and lead to a stable equilibrium. Below a threshold value for research
cost γ, the reaction functions leads to an unstable equilibrium where full spe-
cialisation occurs. Only one company implements R&D activities, whereas the
other chooses to withdraw from research activities. Moreover for even lower lev-
els of γ, the second order conditions may not be fulfilled for Region 2. Therefore,
our theory predicts the following set of testable hypotheses:
Region 1: ∂xi/∂xj < 0
Region 2: ∂xi/∂xj ≤ 0
Region 3: ∂xi/∂xj > 0
Region 4: ∂xi/∂xj ≥ 0
4. Empirical Protocol
The empirical exercise is to estimate R&D reaction functions between any
two firms i and j as shown in equation 7, that is, to estimate the elasticity of
R&D investment decisions x made by firm i with respect to R&D investment
of firm j:
xi = f (xj) + ξi (11)
In order to test the above, we need financial data for figures on R&D decisions
and other firm characteristics, and data that would allow us to determine both
the amount of potential spillovers β and the level of product substitution σ
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between any two firms i and j. Data on the world’s largest corporations allow
us to address these issues.
4.1. Computing the Empirical β − σ Space
Our difficulty lies in the measurement of either product substitution σ or the
degree of spillovers β between any two firms. Concerning product substitution,
one would ideally use demand functions on particular pairs of products, or even
to use the technological characteristics of products to then measure distances
between any pair (Stavins, 1995). In both cases however, data are hard to find,
especially when they need to be combined with additional information such as
technological spillovers and company accounts. Instead on concentrating on
all types of firms, we focus on multi-product firms, and argue that product
substitution, or the degree of market rivalry, can be measured using the vector
of sales of companies across several market segments.
Suppose that multi-product companies can be described by a vector of sales
Y, where generic component Yis provides the amount of sales by firm i for a
given 4-digit sector segment s. One can then compute the Pearson’s correlation
coefficient r between the two vectors Yi with Yj.
σij =
Y˜′iY˜j√
Y˜′iY˜i ·
√
Y˜′jY˜j
(12)
where subscripts i and j denote firms i and j, respectively, and Y˜ is the mean-
centered vector of sales Y. Equation 12 stresses the fact that Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficient r is identical to the widely used cosine index applied to
mean-centered values. For example, Bloom et al. (2007) rely on the cosine in-
dex to measure product market rivalry and technology spillovers. Our choice to
use Pearson’s r is motivated by the fact that the theoretical σ must lie in the
interval [−1.0;+1.0], a feature shared by the empirical measure of σij .
We proceed similarly for the empirical measure of technological spillovers
βij . But instead of relying on sales, we use patent data to measure pairwise
correlation of the technological profile between any dyad. Patent data come from
the USPTO dataset provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research
(Hall et al., 2001). This dataset contains more than 3 million US patents since
1963. Using information on company name and year of application, we selected
the firms most active in patenting5. Importantly, the USPTO dataset assigns
each patent to several international patent technology classes (IPC). The six-
digit technology classes proved too numerous so we adopted the three-digit level,
corresponding to a technological space of 120 technologies.
Let tik be the number of patents applied for by firm i in technology class
k. In order to compensate for abrupt changes in firm learning strategies and
introduce some rigidities in the technology portfolio of firms, we define Tik as the
sum of patent over the past five years: Tik =
∑4
τ=0 tik,−τ . We can then describe
the technological profile of companies by a vector of technological competencies
T, where generic component Tik is the accumulated number of patent in a
5The USPTO patent dataset contains no data on firm consolidations: to overcome this
problem we consulted the 2000 Edition of Who Owns Whom. This exercise proves extremely
useful in inflating the number of patents held by the firms in the sample by more than 300,000
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given technological field. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient r between the
two vectors Ti with Tj reads:
βij =
T˜′iT˜j√
T˜′iT˜i ·
√
T˜′jT˜j
(13)
where subscripts i and j denote firms i and j, respectively, and T˜ is the mean-
centered vector of patent T.
4.2. Control Variables
Past research shows that R&D investment by firms is affected by factors
other than the level of R&D investments of rival firms.
First, we augment Equation 11 with a proxy for the R&D cost parameter
γi. Parameter γi is defined as the unit cost of a patent (P/X)i, where P is
the number of patent granted to firm i. Second, R&D projects carried out by
firms often span over several years, pointing to high persistence in R&D series.
We therefore include a one-year lag in R&D investments Xit−1 to account for
serial correlation in the series. Third, Klepper (1996) and Cohen and Klepper
(1996) have stressed the interdependence of firm size and R&D investments.
Because large firm have an advantage in spreading the cost of research into a
larger span of output, R&D investments tend to increase monotonically with
size. We therefore include firm size K into the empirical model using the gross
value of plant and equipment.
Fourth, strategic investment decisions also depend upon financial constraints
(Cleary, 1999). When returns on investments is subject to substantial uncer-
tainty, as is the case with research activities, firms increase cash flow availability
to secure in-house investments capacities as a response of the lack of external
financial ressources (Baum et al., 2008)6. We therefore include the so-called
liquidity ratio (LR), defined as cash flow availability normalized by current li-
abilities. Should financial markets be imperfect, a positive association between
R&D decisions X and LR should be depicted.
Because variables on firm size and financial constraints influence future de-
cisions, we lag all control variables by one year. Moreover, we include a full
vector of year dummies to account for year-specific shocks common to all firms
in the sample. Unobserved firm heterogeneity is accounted for by the use of
dynamic panel data models.
4.3. Data Sources
Compustat is the source of all firm-level accounting data. Gross value of
property plant and equipment proxies firm size (K); the liquidity ratio LR, the
ratio between cash flow availability and current liabilities, is used to grasp fi-
nancially constrained firms; and X measures R&D investment. Financial data,
6If markets were perfect, investments decisions could be financed by either internal means
or external credit availability, indifferently. In the presence of imperfect market however,
limited access to external financial resources will be compensated by increases in cash avail-
ability provided by the firm itself, making it easier for the company to undertake investments
decisions.
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expressed originally in national currencies, have been converted in US dollars us-
ing the exchange rates provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). All financial data have been deflated into 2005 US
dollars using the Implicit Price Deflator provided by the US Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis7.
Compiling the data from the patent and financial datasets produced an un-
balanced panel dataset of 315 companies observed between 1979 and 2005, yield-
ing 5,504 firm-year observations. These come from various industries which
differ in their R&D intensity (X/Y ). Of all corporations, 201 belong to high-
technology sectors including Chemicals (64 firms), Electronic Equipment (55
firms), Photographic, Medical and Optical Goods (36 firms) and Industrial Ma-
chinery and Computer Equipment (46 companies), with an aggregate R&D
intensity reaching 6%. There are 65 corporations in the medium-technology
sectors, namely in Transportation Equipment (32 firms), in Business Services
(23 firms) and Other Sectors (10 firms), with an aggregate R&D intensity of be-
tween 3% and 5%. The low-technology sector comprises 49 firms (Furniture and
Fixtures, 5 firms; Paper Product, Printing and Publishing, 13 firms; Petroleum
and Refining, 11 firms; Rubber, COncrete and Miscellaneous Products, 8 firms;
Metal Industries, 11 firms).
[Table 1 about here.]
The Cournot-type model developed in Section 2 is based on two firms located
in the β − σ space. We must therefore compute all βij ’s and σij ’s between any
pair of firms in the sample. Since βij = βji and σij = σji , N × (N − 1)/2
where N = 315, 661,653 β and σ measures are produced, depicting the nature
of competition between any two companies i and j.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 displays the number of dyads in the obtained β−σ space, expressed
in centiles. It reveals that most companies tend to avoid direct product and
R&D competition by locating in the bottom left corner of the β − σ space. We
also observe the absence of location in areas of strong technological and product
rivalry, corroborating the idea that the largest corporations develop firm-specific
portfolios of business lines and technological competencies.
4.4. Econometric specifications
The empirical model estimates the reaction function of firm i in its R&D
investment xit, conditional of firm’s j R&D investments xjt. First, we enter all
variables in logs, estimating the elasticity of xi with respect to xj .
xit = α+ ωxjt + ρxit−1 +BCit−1 + ξit (14)
where t = {1979, . . . , t, . . . , 2005}, lower cases indicate log transformed variables,
ω is the parameter of interest and ρ and B are the parameters of the control
7The choice of an appropriate deflator remains an important issue. In the case of the
world’s largest corporations, the issue becomes fiercer. Bearing in mind that firms operate in
several countries and on several markets, we would need to disentangle for any of the variables
the share which pertain to each country and markets.
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variables. This econometric specification must address three important issues,
namely firm unobserved heterogeneity, firm i decision making process and the
endogeneity of the RHS variables xit−1 and xjt.
First, unobserved variations in the characteristics of companies may influ-
ence firm R&D investments beyond and above the chief role of past R&D de-
cisions, rival’s R&D investment, size and financial constraints. Such concealed
dimensions may come from the firm’s research ties developed with private part-
ners or/and with public research organizations, the organizational culture of
the company to locate at the forefront of the technological frontier, or, among
other things, the CEO’s inclination to orientate research programme towards
ambitious and costly objectives. We rely on first-differencing all variables in the
context of dynamic GMM panel data models, a specification which we develop
further below.
Second, the duopoly model of the theoretical Section implies that each firm
makes investment decisions observing optimal investment of the rival company.
Empirically however, companies cope with an array of competitors, so that the
duopoly assumption is, in most markets, violated. In other words, the optimal
R&D decisions depends on the behavior of more than one rival only. Our answer
to this is to assume that companies do not make inference on their optimal R&D
decisions based upon each of their rivals. Similarly to Weintraub et al. (2008), we
assume that firms make oblivious R&D investments based on the R&D decision
of the average rival company. Model 14 then becomes :
xit = α+ ωxjt + ρxit−1 +BCit−1 + ξit (15)
Third, simultaneous decisions by companies imply that if xi is determined by
xj , the opposite relationship equally holds. This mutual dependance together
with the dynamic specification of Specification 15 calls for the use of additional
moment restrictions that can account for the correlation between endogenous
variables xit−1 and xjt with the error term ξit8:
E
ξit
 xit−τixjt−τj
Cit−τc
 = 0 (16)
where we instrument xit−1 and xjt by their own two-year lagged values and
a series of additional instrumental variables which include the two-year lagged
values of the control variables: Zit = {xit−τi , xjt−τj ,Cit−τc}; τi = 3, 4, 5; τj =
2, 3, 4; τc = 0, 1, 2.
Model 15 can be estimated using system GMM dynamic panel data model
estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). Four regressions are performed, one for
each region in the empirical β − σ space. Region 1 gathers dyads where both
technological spillovers and product substitution are low (βij ∈ [−1.0;−.6] and
σij ∈ [−1.0;−.6]). Region 2 concerns dyads where technological similarity is
low (βij ∈ [−1.0;−.6]) but product substitution is high (σij ∈ [+.6;+1.0]). Re-
gion 3 concerns dyads where technological similarity is high (βij ∈ [+.6;+1.0])
8Part of the exogeneity should already be withdrawn when using xj , for if the number of
companies n is high, individual decisions by i will influence xj only marginally, by 1/(n− 1).
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but product substitution is low (σij ∈ [−1.0;−.6]). Region 4 concerns dyads
where both technological similarity and product substitution are high (βij ∈
[+.6;+1.0] and σij ∈ [+.6;+1.0]). Table 2 provides descriptives statistics for
each Region of the empirical β − σ space.
[Table 2 about here.]
Our theory predicts that ω, the sign of the reaction function ∂xi/∂xj , de-
pends on the region of the dyads in the β − σ space. Taking stocks of the
previous discussion, we expect the following:
Region 1: H0: ω ≥ 0 ; Ha: ω < 0
Region 2: H0: ω > 0 ; Ha: ω ≤ 0
Region 3: H0: ω ≤ 0 ; Ha: ω > 0
Region 4: H0: ω < 0 ; Ha: ω ≥ 0
5. Results
5.1. Main Results
Table 3 presents the results, where all sets of exclusion restrictions pass
the Hansen test on the validity of instruments. The results corroborates the
theoretical predictions. In Region 1, a 1% increase in the rival’s firm R&D
investments yields a .25% decrease in firm i R&D investments. In Region 2,
estimated parameter ωˆ remains negative, although less significant and of a small
magnitude. In Regions 3 and 4, the coefficient is both positive and significant,
implying that a 1% increase in R&D investments by the rival company spurs
the firm’s own research activities by .051% (Region 3) and .07% (Region 4),
respectively.
Specification 15 allows the computation of the long-run effects. Because
most research programs span over several years, the observed level of R&D can
adjust only partially to the desired level so that yit−yit−1 = φ(y∗it−yit−1), where
0 < φ < 1. This partial adjustment allows us to recover the long-run multiplier
for each of the short-run policy effects. Setting φ = 1 − ρ, the estimated long-
run effect is simply the sum of an infinite series, such that ω̂LR = ω̂1−ρ̂ . In
Region 1, the long-run elasticities can then lead to significant under-investment
in research activities, for a 1% increase in the rival’s firm R&D investments
yields more than a proportionate decrease in firm i R&D investments. The
long-run impact for the remaining Regions amounts to -.32% (Region 2), 0.43%
(Region 3), and 0.35% (Region 4). These magnitude of the long-run negative
effects in Region 1 suggest that there is a substantial need to internalize positive
knowledge externalities so as to restore private R&D incentives.
[Table 3 about here.]
The parameter estimates stemming from the control variables conform to our
expectations. First, the liquidity ratio is significantly and positively associated
with levels of R&D investments in all regions of the β−σ space. Estimated short
run elasticities span from .035% to .055%. R&D investments embody a high
level of uncertainty which may hinders private external finance. As a response
to the lack of external finance, firms may accumulate cash flow in order to secure
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the financing of future research activities. Moreover, low short-term liabilities
can also be a sign of low financial constraints. In both cases, either high cash
flow availability or low short-term liabilities increase the liquidity ratio, thereby
facilitating the financing of promising research projects.
Second, lagged market shares MS display an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship with R&D investments. Taking market shares as a proxy for firm market
power, this results conform to the theoretical predictions of Aghion et al. (2005)
that two countervailing competition mechanisms operates: when increased com-
petition decreases pre-innovation rents, firms prefer to escape competition by
means of increased R&D investments; conversely, when increased competition
decreases post-innovation rents, the classical schumpeterian effect prevail and
firms find it no longer profitable to increase their research efforts. The theory
suggests that the effect of competition on innovation is crucially mediated by
the initial level of competition. In particular, a positive effect of competition on
innovation prevails in sectors initially characterized by low levels of competition.
Third, Equation 7 predicts that γ, the R&D cost parameter, reduces optimal
R&D x∗i . Our results confirm that an increase in R&D costs will decrease R&D
investments. This negative relationship may come from different channels. In-
creased R&D costs may be seen as increased sunk costs, the profitability of
which being highly uncertain. Increased R&D costs may be also seen as in-
creased fixed costs increasing the minimum scale of post innovation operations.
In both cases, this may act as a counter-incentive for firms to implement new
research projects, thereby decreasing overall R&D investments.
A noteworthy outcome is the stability of all other parameter estimates stem-
ming from the control variables. It suggests that the empirical model is correctly
specified, and reinforces the findings that the sign of the reaction function de-
pends on the location in the β − σ space between any two companies. The
results are in line with the predictions of the theoretical model.
5.2. Robustness Checks
In this Subsection, we perform robustness checks by addressing a number of
issues related with the econometric specification. First, Specification 15 assumes
instantaneous adjustments between xi and xj . However, similar to adaptive
expectations, firms may use information about the rival company at time t− 1,
amending Specification 15 as in the following:
xit = α+ ωxjt−1 + ρxit−1 +BCit−1 + ξit (17)
The results are displayed in Table 4. Estimated coefficients remain qualita-
tively unchanged. Regions 1 and 2 are characterized by negative slops in the
reaction functions, implying that any change in the R&D investment decision by
one company is compensated by a change in the opposite direction by the rival
company. Conversely, in Regions 3 and 4 any variation in the R&D investment
decision by one company is compensated by a change in the same direction by
the rival company. Satisfactorily, the variables on financial constraints (LR)
and R&D costs (γ) keep their expected sign and significance.
[Table 4 about here.]
The lack of efficiency in parameter βk is rather surprising. One would expect
a positive relationship between firm size and R&D investments, although this
11
proportionality may not be unitary. We investigate this issue in two ways. First,
in order to account for the size of both firms i and j, we assume that firms decide
on their R&D intensity, defined as the ratio of R&D investments X over firm
size K. Therefore, we amend Equation 15 as follows:
ln(X/K)it = α+ ωln(X/K)jt + ρ ln(X/K)it−1 +BCit−1 + ξit (18)
This amendment must be understood as a way of normalizing R&D in-
vestments. By controlling for the size of both firms, it is more in line with the
Cournot model of Section 2, where symmetry in cost and production is assumed.
Table 5 displays the results. The results remain qualitatively unchanged with
one notable exception. In Region 2 of substantial production substitution and
negative spillovers, the parameter estimates ω is insignificant. As mentioned
earlier, the reaction function in Region 2 may not reach the demand (slope b)
and R&D conditions (γ) required for stability. In other Regions of the β-σ
space, all ω parameters are larger in magnitude and more efficient.
[Table 5 about here.]
The lack of significance of parameter βk also comes from dynamic specific of
Specification 15. The inclusion of xit−1 obviously absorbs of a substantial share
of the variance of xit, screening our the proportionality relationship between
firm size and R&D investments. Leaving past R&D investments xit−1 aside,
Specification 15 then reads:
xit = α+ ωxjt +BCit−1 + ξit (19)
or
ln(X/K)it = α+ ωln(X/K)jt +BCit−1 + ξit (20)
Table 6 displays the results for both Specifications. First of all, observe that
although the validity of instruments is confirms in all models9, most specifi-
cations suffer from autocorrelation of order 2 in first differences. This is to be
expected since we excluded the lagged dependent variables xit−1, implying that
the results must be taken with caution. The main remark is that, irrespective
of the specification chosen, the findings remain qualitatively unchanged.
[Table 6 about here.]
In the last two Tables of the paper, we focus on parameter ω exclusively
using Specification 15. Recall that thus far, we have assumed that firms make
oblivious decisions based on the mean rival company. We now define the rival
company according to different percentile values: the 5th percentile; the 1st
decile; the 1st quartile; the median; the 3rd quartile, the last decile and the 95th
percentile. Table 7 displays the results.
The main finding is that the set of hypothesis is thoroughly corroborated,
irrespective of where in the distribution of R&D investments the rival company
lies. In Region 2 of intense product market competition and negative spillovers,
9With the exception of Model 14.
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firms decide on the right part of the distribution: in the lower percentiles of the
distribution of R&D investments, parameter ω remains insignificant. With the
exception of Region 3, no specific pattern is found in the size of the elasticity
(the slope of the reaction function) and the location in the distribution of R&D
investments of the rival company. In Region 3, parameter ω increases with
the percentile defining the rival company. This suggests that the slope of the
reaction function increases with the magnitude of R&D investments by the rival
company.
[Table 7 about here.]
At last, Table 8 provides the estimated set of ω for the whole β − σ space,
using Specification 15. The four corners of the Table displays the estimated
coefficients as shown in Table 3.
[Table 8 about here.]
Although very qualitative, Table 8 as inferred from the data conforms to
Figure 1 derived from the theoretical model. We observe that the left (respec-
tively right) column provides consistently negative (resp. positive) estimates,
although efficiency is not always achieve. Interestingly, lack of significance also
seems to follow the diagonal displayed in Figure 1 delimiting the change in sign
for the slope of the reaction functions. Although highly appreciative, these
results corroborates the relevance of the theoretical model.
6. Conclusion
We have developed a two-stage Cournot model where firms decide on opti-
mal process R&D and output under different settings of product substitution
and research spillovers. Our model highlights situations in which R&D of any
two firms can be positively correlated. The sign of the effect of a given firm
investment in R&D on another firm own R&D depends on the joint conditions
of product substitution and research spillovers. We have identified four types
of environments in terms of the level of product substitution and of spillovers.
We then test the prediction of the model on the world’s largest manufacturing
corporations. Assuming that firms make oblivious R&D investments based on
the R&D decision of the average rival company, we develop a dynamic panel
data model that accounts for the endogeneity of the decision of the mean rival
firms. Results corroborate the validity of the theoretical model.
Our results offers support for policies that aim at gathering firms competing
on different markets within a concentrated geographical area. So-called cluster
policies, which increase spillovers, will be effective only if the targeted companies
operate on different product markets, thereby keeping product substitution low.
By doing so, our model predicts that all firms will benefit from the process R&D
carried out by other members of the cluster without being threatened on their
respective product markets. As a consequence, firms will jointly intensify their
research efforts leading to higher levels of R&D investment.
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Figure 1: Optimal R&D, x∗, conditional on β and σ (bγ = 100).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by Region
Variable Region ] Dyads Mean Median St.dev. Min. Max.
xi 1 5,903 5.300 5.266 1.659 -1.616 9.468
xj 1 5,905 5.049 4.979 0.453 2.984 6.203
ki 1 5,902 7.254 7.316 1.822 -0.764 12.35
lnLRi 1 5,706 -1.358 -1.269 1.351 -10.68 2.924
ln γi 1 5,225 -1.451 -1.318 1.184 -7.568 6.116
xi 2 3,780 5.478 5.386 1.616 -0.370 9.468
xj 2 3,780 4.815 4.837 0.982 0.033 8.767
ki 2 3,780 7.172 7.315 1.638 0.108 11.58
lnLRi 2 3,636 -1.323 -1.233 1.361 -10.68 2.703
ln γi 2 3,244 -1.558 -1.410 1.184 -7.568 1.578
xi 3 2,706 6.030 5.994 1.504 0.033 9.468
xj 3 2,706 6.334 6.374 1.293 0.033 9.278
ki 3 2,705 7.750 7.807 1.710 2.011 11.77
lnLRi 3 2,609 -1.231 -1.165 1.245 -6.029 2.677
ln γi 3 2,418 -1.601 -1.464 1.153 -7.224 1.578
xi 4 3,276 5.540 5.538 1.645 -0.916 9.278
xj 4 3,276 5.447 5.553 1.367 -0.916 9.030
ki 4 3,275 7.292 7.356 1.920 -0.296 12.35
lnLRi 4 3,149 -1.229 -1.161 1.321 -5.952 2.790
ln γi 4 2,948 -1.403 -1.279 1.170 -7.568 6.116
See previous Table for the definition of variables.
Region 1: β ∈ [−1.0;−.6]; σ ∈ [−1.0; .− .6]
Region 2: β ∈ [−1.0;−.6]; σ ∈ [+.6;+1.0]
Region 3: β ∈ [+.6;+1.0]; σ ∈ [+.6;+1.0]
Region 4: β ∈ [+.6;+1.0]; σ ∈ [−1.0;−.6]
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Table 3: Firm-level Reaction Functions with Contemporaneous R&D investments of the Mean
Rival Firm. System Dynamic Panel Data GMM.
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
xjt -0.233 -0.089 0.093 0.067
(0.100)** (0.026)*** (0.024)*** (0.019)***
xit−1 0.846 0.810 0.842 0.821
(0.030)*** (0.041)*** (0.036)*** (0.043)***
kit−1 -0.022 0.096 -0.006 0.046
(0.026) (0.033)*** (0.020) (0.032)
lnLRit−1 0.022 0.052 0.018 0.044
(0.009)** (0.009)*** (0.011)* (0.013)***
ln γit−2 -0.078 -0.046 -0.048 -0.072
(0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.019)** (0.021)***
Constant 2.393 0.830 0.366 0.287
(0.612)*** (0.248)*** (0.148)** (0.136)**
Observations 4,564 2,388 1,852 2,058
Number of dyads 295 237 204 208
Hansen J 218.0 162.9 165.7 167.1
Hansen crit. prob. 0.114 0.295 0.246 0.527
AR2 -1.495 -1.210 -0.747 -0.857
AR2 crit. prob. 0.135 0.226 0.455 0.391
Instruments 224 179 179 199
Region 1: β ∈ [−1; . − .6]; σ ∈ [−1; . − .6]; Region 2: β ∈ [−1; . − .6]; σ ∈ [.6; 1];
Region 3: β ∈ [.6; 1]; σ ∈ [.6; 1]; Region 4: β ∈ [.6; 1]; σ ∈ [−1; .− .6]
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regres-
sions include a full vector of unreported year fixed effects. Endogenous regressors
xit−1 and xjt are instrumented using their past level and first-differenced values
lagged 3 to 5 years for and 2 to 4 years, respectively, and all past level and first-
differenced values of all exogenous variables, lagged 1 and 2 years. In model 4,xit−1
is instrumented using past level and first-differenced values lagged 4 to 5 years to
satisfy the exogeneity condition imposed by the Hansen’s J test.
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Table 4: Firm-level Reaction Functions with Lagged R&D investments of the Mean Rival
Firm. System Dynamic Panel Data GMM.
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
(Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7) (Model 8)
xjt−1 -0.161 -0.080 0.065 0.067
(0.082)** (0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.016)***
xit−1 0.864 0.740 0.793 0.723
(0.028)*** (0.046)*** (0.043)*** (0.049)***
kit−1 -0.034 0.126 0.020 0.100
(0.025) (0.041)*** (0.023) (0.036)***
lnLRit−1 0.019 0.059 0.030 0.055
(0.009)** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.015)***
ln γit−2 -0.071 -0.075 -0.083 -0.116
(0.014)*** (0.017)*** (0.022)*** (0.024)***
Constant 1.935 0.936 0.608 0.456
(0.493)*** (0.258)*** (0.169)*** (0.156)***
Observations 4,564 2,388 1,852 2,058
Number of dyads 295 237 204 208
Hansen J 196.7 161.6 154.7 183.4
Hansen crit. prob. 0.0715 0.263 0.402 0.640
AR2 -1.340 -1.571 -0.860 -1.191
AR2 crit. prob. 0.180 0.116 0.390 0.234
Instruments 199 176 176 221
Region 1: β ∈ [−1; . − .6]; σ ∈ [−1; . − .6]; Region 2: β ∈ [−1; . − .6]; σ ∈ [.6; 1];
Region 3: β ∈ [.6; 1]; σ ∈ [.6; 1]; Region 4: β ∈ [.6; 1]; σ ∈ [−1; .− .6]
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regres-
sions include a full vector of unreported year fixed effects. Endogenous regressors
xit−1 and xjt−1 are instrumented using their past level and first-differenced values
lagged 3 to 5 years for and 2 to 4 years, respectively, and all past level and first-
differenced values of all exogenous variables, lagged 1 and 2 years. In model 1,xit−1
is instrumented using past level and first-differenced values lagged 4 to 5 years to
satisfy the exogeneity condition imposed by the Hansen’s J test.
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Table 5: Firm-level Reaction Functions with Contemporaneous R&D intensity of the Mean
Rival Firm. System Dynamic Panel Data GMM.
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
(Model 9) (Model 10) (Model 11) (Model 12)
ln(X/K)jt -0.324 -0.004 0.308 0.078
(0.058)*** (0.018) (0.054)*** (0.024)***
ln(X/K)it−1 0.862 0.793 0.630 0.804
(0.023)*** (0.037)*** (0.055)*** (0.043)***
lnLRit−1 0.035 0.047 0.047 0.053
(0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*** (0.016)***
ln γit−2 -0.026 -0.042 -0.053 -0.062
(0.009)*** (0.012)*** (0.014)*** (0.020)***
Constant -0.770 -0.375 -0.158 -0.180
(0.139)*** (0.081)*** (0.078)** (0.078)**
Observations 4,564 2,388 1,852 2,058
Number of dyads 295 237 204 208
Hansen J 181.7 136.5 153.2 180.9
Hansen crit. prob. 0.223 0.777 0.412 0.670
AR2 0.0672 -1.121 -1.061 -0.161
AR2 crit. prob. 0.946 0.262 0.289 0.872
Instruments 197 174 174 219
Region 1: β ∈ [−1; . − .6]; σ ∈ [−1; . − .6]; Region 2: β ∈ [−1; . − .6]; σ ∈ [.6; 1];
Region 3: β ∈ [.6; 1]; σ ∈ [.6; 1]; Region 4: β ∈ [.6; 1]; σ ∈ [−1; .− .6]
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regres-
sions include a full vector of unreported year fixed effects. Endogenous regressors
xit−1 and xjt are instrumented using their past level and first-differenced values
lagged 3 to 5 years for and 2 to 4 years, respectively, and all past level and first-
differenced values of all exogenous variables, lagged 1 and 2 years. In model 4,xit−1
is instrumented using past level and first-differenced values lagged 4 to 5 years to
satisfy the exogeneity condition imposed by the Hansen’s J test.
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Table 7: Estimated R&D Elasticities for different definitions of the Rival Firm.
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
H0
∂xi
∂xj
≥ O ∂xi
∂xj
> O ∂xi
∂xj
≤ O ∂xi
∂xj
< O
Ha
∂xi
∂xj
< O ∂xi
∂xj
≤ O ∂xi
∂xj
> O ∂xi
∂xj
≥ O
Mean -0.233 -0.089 0.093 0.058
(0.100) (0.026) (0.024) (0.018)
[0.010] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pct = 5 -0.076 0.035 0.019 0.036
(0.073) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
[0.148] [0.980] [0.126] [0.004]
Pct = 10 -0.204 0.036 0.039 0.027
(0.073) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012)
[0.003] [0.970] [0.009] [0.013]
Pct = 25 -0.154 -0.016 0.056 0.038
(0.091) (0.023) (0.017) (0.015)
[0.046] [0.240] [0.000] [0.004]
Pct = 50 -0.172 -0.091 0.069 0.056
(0.091) (0.025) (0.022) (0.018)
[0.030] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
. . . .
Pct = 75 -0.199 -0.095 0.089 0.042
(0.064) (0.025) (0.025) (0.014)
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Pct = 90 -0.229 -0.071 0.107 0.033
(0.061) (0.018) (0.026) (0.012)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003]
Pct = 95 -0.103 -0.069 0.116 0.030
(0.042) (0.017) (0.026) (0.012)
[0.008] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005]
Region 1: β ∈ [−1; . − .6]; σ ∈ [−1; . − .6]; Region 2: β ∈
[−1; .− .6]; σ ∈ [.6; 1]; Region 3: β ∈ [.6; 1]; σ ∈ [.6; 1]; Region 4:
β ∈ [.6; 1]; σ ∈ [−1; .− .6]
Robust standard errors in parentheses. One tailed critical prob-
ability value in brackets. All elasticities are obtained from GMM
system panel data regressions including a full vector of year fixed
effects. Endogenous regressors xit−1 and xjt are instrumented
using their past level and first-differenced values lagged 3 to 5
years for xit−1 and 2 to 4 years for xit−1 , and all past level and
first-differenced values of all exogenous variables, lagged 1 and 2
years.
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Table 8: Estimated Elasticities in the β − σ Space
β
σ [−1.0;−.6] ]− .6; .− .2] ]− .2;+.2] ] + .2;+.6] ] + .6;+1.0]
[+.6;+1.0] -0.089 -0.033 0.026 0.037 0.093
(0.026) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.024)
[0.000] [0.022] [0.041] [0.003] [0.000]
] + .2;+.6] -0.088 -0.063 -0.046 0.013 0.010
(0.027) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.180] [0.292]
[−.2;+.2] -0.021 0.022 -0.014 -0.016 0.010
(0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011)
[0.122] [0.110] [0.159] [0.123] [0.187]
]− .6;−.2] -0.057 -0.022 0.007 0.016 0.008
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
[0.000] [0.078] [0.333] [0.122] [0.274]
[−1.0;−.6] -0.233 0.002 -0.002 0.041 0.058
(0.100) (0.030) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
[0.010] [0.473] [0.466] [0.012] [0.000]
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed critical probability value in brackets. All
elasticities are obtained from GMM system panel data regressions including a full vector of
year fixed effects. Endogenous regressors xit−1 and xjt are instrumented using their past
level and first-differenced values lagged 3 to 5 years for xit−1 and 2 to 4 years for xit−1 , and
all past level and first-differenced values of all exogenous variables, lagged 1 and 2 years.
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